Plutonium management policy in the United Kingdom: The need for a dual track strategy by Hyatt, N.C.
Energy Policy 99 (2016) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎Contents lists available at ScienceDirectEnergy Policyhttp://d
0301-42
E-m
Pleasjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpolPlutonium management policy in the United Kingdom:
The need for a dual track strategy
Neil C. Hyatt
Immobilisation Science Laboratory, Department of Materials Science and Engineering, The University of Shefﬁeld, Sir Robert Hadﬁeld Building, Mappin Street,
Shefﬁeld S1 3JD, UKH I G H L I G H T S Policy and technology developments in US plutonium disposition programme are analysed.
 The vulnerabilities of the UK policy for plutonium reuse as MOX fuel are assessed.
 Adoption of dual-track approach to management of UK plutonium is recommended.a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 3 January 2016
Received in revised form
20 August 2016
Accepted 26 August 2016
Keywords:
Plutonium
MOX
Immobilisationx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.08.033
15/& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevie
ail address: n.c.hyatt@shefﬁeld.ac.uk
e cite this article as: Hyatt, N.C., (20a b s t r a c t
The United Kingdom holds the largest stockpile of separated civil plutonium in the world, projected to
reach 140 t, at the end of this decade, when reprocessing operations are complete. UK Government policy
is that this material should be reused as MOX fuel in Light Water Reactors. This policy is re-examined in
the light of recent experience of the US plutonium disposition programme, in which the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility is now considered to be potentially unaffordable. Problematic aspects of US pro-
gramme, relevant to the UK scenario, are reviewed, to understand the possible impact on UK policy.
Based on the US experience and inherent uncertainty regarding the capital and operational costs of MOX
fuel fabrication and plutonium immobilisation facilities, and the associated technical risks, it is concluded
that the UK policy should explicitly adopt a dual track strategy to plutonium management, with com-
mitment that: any remaining plutonium which is not converted into MOX fuel, or otherwise reused, will be
immobilised and treated as waste for disposal. This will also ensure that the UK is positioned and prepared
to take forward an immobilisation and disposal programme for the plutonium stockpile, should reuse as
MOX fuel not prove an economic or viable option.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The UK holds stockpile of separated plutonium which is
projected to exceed 140 t at the end of planned nuclear fuel
reprocessing operations in 2020 (Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority, 2014), this is the largest stockpile of plutonium
under civil safeguards worldwide. Current stocks of UK pluto-
nium are summarised in Table 1 (Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation,
2014).
In the 1960's, the projected growth of civil nuclear energy, and
depletion of ﬁnite fossil fuel reserves, focused attention on the
development of fast reactor systems capable of improving the ef-
ﬁciency of uranium resource utilisation, by breeding Pu-239 from
fertile U-238 (99.3% natural abundance). Such fast reactor systemsr Ltd. This is an open access article
16), http://dx.doi.org/10.101require an initial core of plutonium driver fuel, which, in the UK,
was to be produced by reprocessing of nuclear fuel from Magnox,
and, later, Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGRs). Ultimately, fossil
fuel prices remained largely stable, accessible reserves of uranium
ores increased, and the anticipated growth of civil nuclear energy
was not realised. In this context, the commercial viability of fast
reactor systems could not be demonstrated and development was
largely abandoned. Commercial scale reprocessing and MOX fuel
fabrication also proved challenging, with throughput below target
in the Magnox reprocessing plant, Thermal Oxide Reprocessing
Plant (THORP), and Sellaﬁeld MOX Plant (Global Fissile Material
Report, 2015). The UK cancelled its fast reactor programme in
1994, but plutonium separation continued due to technical con-
straints and reprocessing contract obligations. This, combined
with below target reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication, led to
the accumulation of the current stockpile, in the absence of aunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table 1
UK civil plutonium inventory as of 31 December 2014, as published by the Ofﬁce of
Nuclear Regulation; of the total reported 23.0 teHM is owned by foreign bodies
(Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation, 2014).
Item Amount (teHM)
Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at re-
processing plants
122.1
Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manu-
facture or fabrication and plutonium contained in uni-
rradiated semi-fabricated or unﬁnished products at fuel or
other fabricating plants or elsewhere
0.8
Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabri-
cated products at reactor sites or elsewhere
1.9
Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere. 1.5
Total 126.2
Box 1–Plutonium disposition by immobilisation.
The aim of plutonium disposition by immobilisation is to
incorporate plutonium, at the atomic scale, within a suitable
host material, yielding a passively safe and proliferation
resistant waste package for final disposal. In this approach,
the host material, which may be an amorphous glass or
crystalline ceramic, may incorporate plutonium by substitu-
tion of another chemical element within the framework of its
constituent atoms. For example, in the case of the candidate
ceramic material zirconolite, CaZrTi2O7, the mechanism of
substitution could involve Pu4þ replacing Zr4þ , e.g.
CaZr1xPuxTi2O7. Glass-ceramic materials are also consid-
ered for plutonium immobilisation, in which plutonium is
partitioned within a highly durable ceramic phase encapsu-
lated within a glass matrix that incorporates entrained
impurities.
Selection of the host phase and plutonium incorporation
mechanism is made against material performance criteria,
which typically include: durability – stability toward corrosion
by ground water in the disposal environment; waste loading –
the quantity of plutonium incorporated per unit volume;
radiation tolerance – the resistance to loss of mechanical
integrity through self radiation damage; process compatibil-
ity – the efficacy of manufacture within the constraints of a
nuclear facility; and availability of natural analogues – the
existence of corresponding natural mineral phases which
demonstrate material longevity for the required service
lifetime of 4105 years. A considerable body of evidence
has established a tool box of glass and ceramic phases which
admirably fulfil these criteria, including the example of
zirconolite given above; for authoritative reviews see
(Ewing, 2005, 2007; Weber et al., 1998, 1997).
The selection of one or more candidate materials for
application in plutonium (or other actinide) immobilisation, is
the focus of national programmes which, in addition to
providing the fundamental scientific evidence to support
selection of a host phase, must also demonstrate compat-
ibility with the nature of the waste feedstock (e.g. metal or
oxide form, particle size and habit, entrained contaminants)
and deployment within an industrially mature manufacturing
process.
Immobilisation and disposal of plutonium in a passively
safe tailored wasteform offers two considerable advantages
over disposition by irradiation and disposal as MOX fuel (or
vitrified waste from MOX reprocessing). First, the thermal
output of MOX fuels (or vitrified waste) at the envisaged time
of emplacement, demands a much larger repository footprint
to separate waste packages than is the case for a tailored
wasteform (in order to preserve the integrity of clay buffer
material used to surround the waste containers). Second,
disposal of MOX fuel demands an environment in which
geochemically reducing conditions are maintained for the
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systems.1
In the UK, plutonium management policy is deﬁned by Gov-
ernment, supported by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
(NDA) who provide the necessary strategic analysis and options for
the implementation of policy. The risk and hazard associated with
the UK plutonium stockpile has been the focus of considerable
debate. An inﬂuential report of the Royal Society in 2007, con-
cluded that “The status quo of continuing to stockpile a very
dangerous material is not an acceptable long-term option” and
urged Government “to develop and implement a strategy for the
management of separated plutonium as an integral part of its
energy and radioactive waste polices” (The Royal Society, 2007).
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) commissioned
a Credible Options Analysis for long term plutonium management,
which identiﬁed three primary options for plutonium manage-
ment, that could conceivably be implemented within 25 years
(Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2010):
 The current strategy of long-term storage (followed by im-
mobilisation disposal);
 Prompt immobilisation and direct disposal;
 Reuse as fuel, with conversion to Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for
burning in current Light Water Reactor (LWR) designs as the
reference scenario2.
NDA later concluded that plutonium reuse as MOX in the
CANDU EC6 heavy water reactor and reuse in the GE Hitachi
PRISM fast reactor, were also credible options, but acknowledged
signiﬁcant technical and commercial risks in implementation of all
reuse and immobilisation options (Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority, 2014). The science and strategy of plutoniumrequired timescale (such that uranium is maintained as more
insoluble uranium (IV) and oxidation to soluble uranium (VI)
is precluded); this is not necessarily a constraint for a tailored
wasteform. In the context of geological disposal of radio-
active wastes, these factors are important considerations in
safety assessment and overall cost of a geological disposal
facility, and hence the choice of a MOX or immobilisation
strategy for plutonium disposition.
1 At the time, reprocessing was considered the only feasible approach to the
management of Magnox and AGR fuels, due to their susceptibility to corrosion in
prolonged wet storage.
2 MOX fuel comprises a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides, as a solid
solution (U,Pu)O2 and/or a blend of discrete UO2 and PuO2 phases. MOX fuels are
fabricated in a similar fashion to ordinary UO2 (UOX) fuels, with a typical reactor
grade PuO2 content of ca. 7% for use in LWRs, which generally operate with a core
loading of 30% MOX fuel (Status and Advances in MOX Fuel Technology, 2003). The
ﬁssile content of such fuels is equivalent to a 235U enrichment of ca. 4% in UOX fuel
(Status and Advances in MOX Fuel Technology, 2003). The World Nuclear Asso-
ciation estimates 40 European LWRs are licensed to use MOX fuel, with more than
30 doing so (World Nuclear Association, 2016). The key strategic driver for adoption
of MOX fuel is sustainability of ﬁssile material resources, by production of energy
from plutonium created from irradiation of UOX fuels in LWRs. However, the ha-
zard, security and safeguards of plutonium separation, through reprocessing of
nuclear fuels, and the attendant proliferation risks, are of international concern.
These strategic drivers and the international status of MOX fuel technology are
summarised in a recent IAEA Technical Report (Status and Advances in MOX Fuel
Technology, 2003).
Please cite this article as: Hyatt, N.C., (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10immobilisation and disposal are brieﬂy summarised in Box 1.
Building on NDA's Credible Options Analysis, the UK Govern-
ment commissioned a consultation exercise in 2011, to support
identiﬁcation of a preferred plutonium management option (De-
partment of Energy and Climate Change, 2011). The policy position
was deﬁned by the Department of Energy and Climate Change in
the consultation response published in 2013 (Department of En-
ergy and Climate Change, 2013):16/j.enpol.2016.08.033i
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sons the preferred policy for managing the vast majority of UK
civil separated plutonium is reuse and it therefore should be
converted to MOX fuel for use in civil nuclear reactors. Any re-
maining plutonium whose condition is such that it cannot be
converted into MOX will be immobilised and treated as waste for
disposal.
The preference for plutonium reuse as MOX fuel was driven
primarily by the perceived maturity of this technology, compared
to immobilisation of the stockpile for disposal, plus revenue gen-
eration from energy production, which would be expected to
make MOX the most cost-effective option. However, the policy
statement makes clear that:
Only when the Government is conﬁdent that its preferred option
could be implemented safely and securely, that it is affordable,
deliverable, and offers value for money, will it be in a position to
proceed with a new MOX plant. If we cannot establish a means of
implementation that satisﬁes these conditions then the way for-
ward may need to be revised.
The aim of this contribution is to re-examine the UK policy
position, in the context of recent experience in the United States of
America, which is reconsidering its strategy to disposition 34 t of
excess weapons plutonium as MOX fuel, although construction of
the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is more than 50% com-
plete, at a cost, to date, exceeding $ 4 billion (Department of En-
ergy, 2014). Expert international opinion has also questioned the
fundamental technical reliability and economic credibility of plu-
tonium disposition in the US and elsewhere (Global Fissile Mate-
rial Report, 2015; von Hippel et al., 2012). In the light of the US
experience of plutonium disposition as MOX fuel, summarised
below, the current UK policy position is considered potentially
vulnerable, if the position on reuse as the preferred option were to
change. In essence, the UK policy embodies a single-track strategy
for management of plutonium, immobilisation is only explicitly
considered for plutonium whose condition is such that it cannot be
converted into MOX fuel. It is proposed that UK policy should
adopt a more ﬂexible dual-track strategy to plutonium manage-
ment with explicit advocacy of immobilisation and disposal for any
plutonium which is not designated for reuse as MOX or other nuclear
fuel. Such an amendment to the current policy would provide the
required latitude to develop the capability to implement an im-
mobilisation and disposal approach for the whole stockpile, should
MOX reuse prove uneconomic or unviable. Indeed, this is re-
cognised in current NDA strategy, with a commitment to “develop
an approach to immobilisation of plutonium for that part of the
inventory which is unsuitable for re-use and in the event that re-
use cannot be successfully implemented” (Nuclear Decom-
missioning Authority, 2016).2. Evolution of the US plutonium disposition programme
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties committed the US and
Soviet Union to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, leading
to ca. 50 t of plutonium being declared excess to requirements by
each nation (Department of Energy, 2014). The National Academy
of Sciences advised the US Government to adopt a “dual-track
strategy” for managing this plutonium inventory, with parallel
development of MOX fuel and immobilisation approaches (Com-
mittee on International Security and Arms Control, 1994). The ra-
tionale of this strategy was twofold: to de-risk the programme
given the uncertainties in cost and technical implementation, and
to achieve earlier completion of the disposition mission, given that
a fraction of the excess plutonium could be unsuitable for use asPlease cite this article as: Hyatt, N.C., (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101MOX fuel. Under the Clinton Administration, the US Department of
Energy (US DOE) committed to this dual track strategy in 1997
(Department of Energy, 1997), stating that “Pursuing both im-
mobilisation and MOX fuel fabrication… provides important in-
surance against uncertainties of implementing either approach by
itself” (Department of Energy, 1999). The Plutonium Management
and Disposition Agreement, signed in 2000, subsequently com-
mitted both the US and Russian Federation to each disposition a
minimum of 34 t of excess weapons grade plutonium by irradia-
tion as MOX fuel (Department of State), with provision for some
US material to be dispositioned by immobilisation and disposal.
Following a review of the plutonium disposition programme under
the Bush Administration, US DOE cancelled the immobilisation
programme in 2002, ostensibly due to budgetary constraints
(Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration, 2002). Thereafter, the US was committed to disposition of
34 t of excess weapons grade plutonium as MOX fuel which, cru-
cially, now included 6.5 t of material originally planned for im-
mobilisation (Holt and Nikitin, 2014).
Since 2002, the US has defaulted to a single-track disposition
strategy involving construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Fa-
cility on the Savannah River Site. Work started on MFFF design in
1999, with construction beginning in 2007. The facility was ori-
ginally estimated to cost $1 billion and be delivered by 2016
(Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration, 2003). By 2014, the cost estimate had grown to in excess of
$7.7 billion, with operations expected by 2019 at the earliest
(Department of Energy, 2014). A later study by Aerospace Cor-
poration, concluded that construction of MFFF could not be com-
pleted before 2100 at the annual funding level assigned in 2014, at
a total cost of ca. $27–30 billion (Plutonium Disposition Study
Options Independent Assessment Phase 1 Report, 2015) (real year
dollars). The divergent estimates of MFFF completion costs were
analysed by the US DOE commissioned “Red Team” review, whose
report was disclosed by the Union of Concerned Scientists (Final
Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team, 2015). This analysis
highlighted the different programme components, assumptions
and methodologies utilised in previous studies to derive cost es-
timates, including different approaches to evaluating project risks
and uncertainties. The Red Team analysis suggests a minimum cost
of $12.6 billion would be required to complete MFFF, at an as-
signed budget of $700–800 M per year, for 15 years, to ﬁnish
construction, followed by 3 years of commissioning activity, with
operations commencing in ca. 2033 (ﬁnancial year 2015 dollars).
In response to escalating cost and timescale of MFFF delivery,
the Obama Administration announced in 2013 that “This current
plutonium disposition approach may be unaffordable … due to
cost growth and ﬁscal pressure” (Executive Ofﬁce of the President
of the United States, 2014). In its budget proposal for ﬁnancial year
2015, the Obama Administration declared: “Following a year-long
review of the plutonium disposition programme, the Budget pro-
vides funding to place the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication
Facility in South Carolina into cold-standby. NNSA [the National
Nuclear Security Administration] is evaluating alternative pluto-
nium disposition technologies to MOX that will achieve a safe and
secure solution more quickly and cost effectively” (Executive Ofﬁce
of the President of the United States, 2015). Although the MFFF
project may, in future, be completed, this seems a questionable
prospect, given the US DOE commissioned “Red Team” report
which advocated the lower cost and uncertainty of plutonium
disposition through a “dilute and dispose” strategy (Final Report of
the Plutonium Disposition Red Team, 2015). This process involves
mixing the plutonium with an unspeciﬁed proprietary material
(referred to as “star dust”) and disposal of waste packages in the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant – the US transuranic geological disposal
facility, located in NewMexico, at a depth of 650 m, within a stable6/j.enpol.2016.08.033i
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Team, 2015).3. The MOX fuel fabrication facility
To understand the extent to which UK plutonium management
policy may be vulnerable to the difﬁculties encountered in deli-
vering the MFFF, a brief description of the facility is warranted,
prior to an appraisal of the problematic aspects of delivery which
may be relevant to the UK position. The MFFF is based on the
French MELOX plant, developed by AREVA, and comprises pluto-
nium puriﬁcation, MOX fuel fabrication, analytical chemistry, and
buffer storage facilities (Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition
Red Team, 2015; Hylko, 2012). The main MFFF building has a foot
print of over 45,000 m2 and is constructed from reinforced con-
crete (Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team, 2015;
Hylko, 2012). The key functions of MFFF include:
3.1. Aqueous polishing
In which plutonium oxide is dissolved in nitric acid and solvent
extraction is used to remove uranium, americium, gallium and
other contaminants; the plutonium is then precipitated and cal-
cined to yield (ideally) pure plutonium oxide.
3.2. MOX fuel fabrication
In which plutonium oxide is blended, mixed with uranium oxide,
milled, pelletised and sintered, using a heavily automated process;
MOX fuel pellets which pass quality control assessment are loaded
into Zircaloy fuel pins, which are combined to form fuel assemblies.
In addition, MFFF operations are supported by feed preparation
in the H-Canyon facility in which scrap plutonium material is
dissolved in nitric acid and sentenced to the aqueous polishing
process in MFFF.
It is not anticipated that a UK MOX fuel production plant would
require an aqueous polishing process, which accounts for around
half of the MFFF budget. In the UK, it is considered that amercium-
241, and other impurities, could be managed through blending of
plutonium oxide batches for the vast majority of the stockpile.3
Otherwise, the MOX fuel fabrication lines envisaged for MFFF are
likely to be similar to those in a UK counterpart facility, notwith-
standing the key differences in the grade of the plutonium and
hence criticality considerations, and location dependent design
requirements such as seismic qualiﬁcation. There remains some
uncertainty as to whether blending of UK Magnox and AGR de-
rived plutonium could reduce the americium-241 content to o4%,
as required for MOX fuel fabrication and reuse in light water re-
actors (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2010). The proportion
of the stockpile which can be reused is clearly time dependent
and, given the current absence of commercial interest in utilising
MOX fuel in present and future LWR reactors, an aqueous polish-
ing facility may ultimately be required.
An apparent difference between the UK and US scenarios, is the
need to manage reactor or weapons grade plutonium, deﬁned
according to the plutonium-240 content4 (Mark, 1993; Nuclear3 Arising from β-decay of plutonium-241, with a half life of 14 years.
4 Weapons grade plutonium is characterised by a Pu-240 content of o6%,
since this isotope has a high rate of spontaneous ﬁssion and hence neutron pro-
duction, resulting in low explosive yield through premature initiation of the ﬁssion
chain reaction under implosion (Mark, 1993). Note that some plutonium derived
from low burn up Magnox fuel has a much lower Pu-240 content (16.9%) compared
to that derived from high burnup Magnox and typical light water reactor fuel (ca.
24%) or AGR fuel (30%) (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2008).
Please cite this article as: Hyatt, N.C., (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.10Decommissioning Authority, 2008). Appraisal of the challenge in
developing an explosive design for reactor grade plutonium con-
cluded that this would not be “appreciably different”, relative to
weapons grade material, and, therefore, “the need for safeguards
to protect against the diversion and misuse of separated pluto-
nium applies essentially equally to all grades of plutonium” (Mark,
1993). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that a UK MOX fuel fab-
rication facility would not require appreciably different security
and safeguards infrastructure, although the precise design re-
quirements and regulatory controls may be different.4. Audit analysis of cost and schedule overruns of MFFF
Fundamentally, the escalating cost and delay of the MFFF pro-
ject was the result of an “approved project baseline which was
developed from an incomplete design” in 2007, according to a US
DOE audit (Department of Energy, 2014). This resulted in incorrect
assumptions regarding skilled labour, equipment speciﬁcation,
installation times, and costs. The audit noted that independent
reviewers had previously highlighted that “project cost and sche-
dule estimates were at a signiﬁcant risk of increasing when using a
phased or incremental approach to completing a MOX Facility
design” (Department of Energy, 2014).
A recent US Government Audit Ofﬁce review of the plutonium
disposition programme identiﬁed several areas of concern, in re-
lation to the increased cost and delay of MFFF, these included
(United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce, 2014):
 Inadequate design of the plutonium glovebox handling systems
and support infrastructure, which are integral to fuel fabrication
operations. The MFFF design drew heavily on that of the MELOX
plant, but the cost of the required adaptations was apparently
not well understood prior to design approval.
 Inadequate understanding of the ability of the commercial
supply chain to provide skilled labour, components, and
equipment, to meet the demanding quality standards required
in a nuclear environment.
 Substantive variations to the project scope and construction
contract, impacting the cost and schedule of the MFFF.
 The effectiveness of interim project reviews in challenging un-
realistic assumptions and cost estimates and the response of
project management, in terms of mitigating actions.
 The need for independent assessment and review of the overall
life-cycle cost estimates for the plutonium disposition
programme.
Major amendments to the initial MFFF scope were required to
enable treatment of the 6.5 t of plutonium originally scheduled for
immobilisation (Holt and Nikitin, 2014), as reported by Lyman
(2014) and von Hippel and MacKerron (2015). To bring this ma-
terial within the quality speciﬁcation for use in MOX fuel, sup-
plementary aqueous polishing lines were required to remove the
additional contaminants. Modiﬁcation of MFFF to accommodate
this process required additional equipment and infrastructure,
increasing plant footprint by ca. 10%. As a consequence of the
supplementary aqueous polishing system, the increased projection
of transuranic waste demanded construction of a dedicated Waste
Solidiﬁcation Building, which had not been planned for. However,
US DOE had previously acknowledged that “there are considerable
uncertainties with how much … material will be accepted by the
programme due to uncertainties with characterisation data and
acceptance of material based on an ability to meet the MOX fuel
speciﬁcation” (Department of Energy). In addition, modiﬁcation of
the original MFFF design was also required to accommodate a Pit
Feed Preparation facility, following a decision to cancel a separate16/j.enpol.2016.08.033i
N.C. Hyatt / Energy Policy 99 (2016) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 5Pit Conversion Facility on the Savannah River Site (Department of
Energy, 2014).5. Impact on UK plutonium management policy
The US plutonium disposition programme opted to pursue a
single-track strategy for reuse of excess weapons plutonium as
MOX fuel on the basis of the apparent technical maturity, com-
pared to immobilisation and disposal technology, and, ostensibly,
budget constraints that prohibited a dual-track strategy. Never-
theless, adaptation of a technically mature MOX fuel fabrication
process has proven prohibitively more challenging than expected.
At a fundamental level, failure to adequately design and cost the
glovebox infrastructure required for MFFF, poses one plausible
challenge to the UK MOX reuse policy, because the preferred op-
tion for reuse in LWRs is based on adaptation of the same MELOX
reference design. NDA's Plutonium Credible Options Analysis,
quite reasonably, used data supplied by MELOX operator, AREVA,
and published information from the MFFF project, in bench
marking the MOX reuse option (Nuclear Decommissioning Au-
thority, 2010). Review of the design basis assumptions and cost
data, for a UK MOX fuel fabrication plant would therefore seem
appropriate, in the light of the US experience.
Construction of a UK MOX fuel fabrication plant would require
extensive supply chain engagement, as in the construction of MFFF.
The UK reuse policy is potentially vulnerable to the same challenge
associated with provision of services and equipment to nuclear
standards. A signiﬁcant contributor to the increased cost of MFFF
was the excessive turnover of a skilled workforce, which was in
high demand. Given the 100 y timescale and d70 billion (dis-
counted) cost of the UK nuclear decommissioning programme
(Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2015), the demand for skilled
nuclear workers is expected to remain high, even in the absence of
a UK MOX fuel fabrication plant. Hence, effective planning of
workforce needs will be essential to ensuring cost effective delivery
of a new MOX plant to cost and schedule. This consideration also
applies to delivery of a plutonium immobilisation plant.
The strategic drivers on the UK and US plutonium disposition
programmes are very different and it is unlikely that the UK MOX
reuse mission would be subject to radical changes in scope, as in
the US case, since the option to immobilise and dispose of pluto-
nium unsuitable for MOX use remains open. Nevertheless, in the
absence of detailed characterisation data, it cannot be assumed
with certainty that all of the plutonium thought to be suitable for
MOX fuel manufacture could be so utilised, without aqueous
polishing to remove amerciuim-241 and/or other contaminants.
Managing americium-241 ingrowth for MOX fuel manufacture, by
blending of plutonium produced from reprocessing of Magnox and
UOX fuels becomes more problematic with time, increasing the
probability that aqueous polishing of plutonium feedstocks would
be required. More problematic is the fact that no (potential)
commercial operator in the UK has yet indicated an interest in
accepting MOX fuel. The price of enrichment and UOX fuel has
remained stable over the last decade, and, although demand for
uranium has increased, production has increased to meet this
demand (Uranium 2009, 2010; Euratom, 2015). This trend is an-
ticipated to be maintained for the foreseeable future (Euratom,
2015; World Nuclear Association, 2015), and the commercial ap-
petite for MOX off take in the UK is expected to remain weak.
Electricite de France, the owner and operator of the existing Si-
zewell B PWR and proposed Hinkley Point C EPRs, which could in
principle accept MOX fuel, has expressed no interest in MOX off
take. Sizewell B is not currently licensed for use of MOX fuel, and
the Generic Design Assessment of the proposed EPRs explicitly
excluded consideration of MOX fuel utilisation (Generic DesignPlease cite this article as: Hyatt, N.C., (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.101Assessment, 2011). Consequently, there is a risk to the UK MOX
reuse policy from inherent uncertainties in the quality of the
plutonium feedstock reuse, the lead time to construct a fuel fab-
rication plant, and the availability of new reactors willing to accept
MOX fuel. The risks to delivery of a plutonium immobilisation
programme are associated with the lead time to construct the
immobilisation facility and a Geological Disposal Facility for dis-
position. These risks are highlighted in the NDA Credible Options
analysis of 2010 but would now beneﬁt from greater scrutiny,
following the US experience.6. The need for a dual-track strategy within UK plutonium
manage policy
The UK policy for plutonium management is essentially a single-
track strategy, with reuse in MOX fuel identiﬁed as the preferred
option, and immobilisation and disposal considered only for ma-
terial whose condition is such that cannot be converted into MOX
fuel. A vulnerability of this policy is that if, in the future, MOX
proves unaffordable or is not accepted by utility operators, then the
bulk of the stockpile, whose condition is currently thought to ac-
ceptable for MOX fuel manufacture, would be effectively stranded
without a disposition route. Indeed, the UK Government's policy
statement acknowledges that if implementation of the MOX reuse
strategy cannot be achieved then “the way forward may need to be
revised” (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013).
If the current UK policy on reuse of plutonium as MOX fuel were
to be superseded by a policy of immobilisation and disposal, the UK
would potentially be better placed to implement such a policy,
compared to the US scenario, because immobilisation and disposal
technology will at least be progressed to address waste plutonium
whose condition is unsuitable for MOX fuel manufacture. However,
it could not be assumed that such technology could be directly
applied or scaled up for the purpose of immobilising the whole
stockpile, indeed a ceramic wasteform could be preferable for plu-
tonium stockpile immobilisation, compared to the glass-ceramic
wasteform developed for waste plutonium immobilisation, given
the more efﬁcient incorporation rate (Squire et al., 2015; Maddrell
et al., 2015). The kinetics of plutonium surrogate incorporation
within ceramic wasteforms produced by Hot Isostatic Pressing, are
known depend on the particle size and habit of the feedstock in
combination with the choice of ceramic forming oxides, powder
milling parameters, lubricant, and hot pressing conditions (Squire
et al., 2015). An existing plutonium waste treatment plant, opti-
mised to produce glass-ceramic wasteforms, would not necessarily
be compatible or amenable to cost-effective adaptation to produce
optimised ceramic wasteforms for stockpile immobilisation.
Immobilisation and disposal is the only credible option for
plutonium management which is capable of addressing the com-
plete plutonium stockpile, including material whose condition is
deemed unsuitable for MOX fuel manufacture. The evidence from
the US MFFF project is that maintaining the option to immobilise
the whole plutonium stockpile, in an explicit dual-track strategy, is
desirable to mitigate the considerable technical and cost un-
certainties associated with MOX and immobilisation technologies.
Ensuring UK policy accommodates a dual-track strategy would
provide ﬂexibility to undertake research and development of im-
mobilisation technology, in order to fully leverage data and ex-
perience from a small scale waste plutonium treatment pro-
gramme, for a large scale stockpile immobilisation programme. For
example, plutonium incorporation rates are a much more im-
portant consideration for immobilisation of stockpile versus waste
plutonium, since the number of waste packages, and interim sto-
rage space, scales inversely with incorporation rate. Under an
amended policy, investigation of very high incorporation rates for6/j.enpol.2016.08.033i
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to potential application to the plutonium stockpile, which is con-
sistent with the aspirations of current NDA Strategy, as highlighted
above (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2016). An explicit
dual-track strategy of this nature would improve the robustness of
the UK plutonium management policy against material and com-
mercial uncertainties.7. Conclusions and policy implications
A brief and high level consideration of the US plutonium dis-
position programme has highlighted the beneﬁt of an explicit
dual-track strategy to the reuse and immobilisation of plutonium
stockpiles. Although there are signiﬁcant differences in the stra-
tegic drivers for the US and UK MOX reuse strategies, the UK reuse
policy is vulnerable to some of the problematic issues that have
frustrated delivery of the US MFFF to cost and schedule. Review of
the design basis assumptions and cost data, for a UK MOX fuel
fabrication plant would therefore seem appropriate, in the light of
the US experience. The UK is better prepared to adapt to un-
certainties in the suitability of plutonium reuse as MOX fuel, and
any future change in reuse policy, through development of an
immobilisation and disposal approach for waste plutonium.
Nevertheless, ensuring UK policy accommodates a dual track
strategy would strengthen this position further, by supporting
enhancement of immobilisation and disposal research pro-
grammes, so as to adequately address the plutonium stockpile, if
required. The current policy is challenged by this approach, with
its exclusive focus on the application of immobilisation and dis-
posal to plutonium whose condition is such that it cannot be re-
used as MOX fuel. Amendment of current UK policy position to
address this issue, should also provide ﬂexibility with respect to
alternative reuse options for UK plutonium such as deployment as
MOX fuel in the CANDU heavy water reactor design or as a metallic
fuel in the GE-Hitachi PRISM sodium cooled fast reactor design
(Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2014). In conclusion, it is
recommended that UK plutonium management policy adopt a
more nuanced and ﬂexible position on immobilisation and dis-
posal, with a commitment that: any remaining plutonium which is
not converted into MOX, or otherwise reused, will be immobilised and
treated as waste for disposal.Acknowledgements
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